On October 8, 2025, the US Navy’s guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) docked at Chattogram Port in Bangladesh, marking the first such visit by an American warship in 54 years since the nation’s 1971 Liberation War.
Welcomed ceremonially by the Bangladesh Navy’s BNS Abu Ubaidah, the Arleigh Burke-class vesselโcarrying approximately 300 personnelโhas been officially framed as a three-day “goodwill visit” to foster bilateral naval cooperation, joint exercises on maritime security, piracy prevention, and disaster management.
The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) statements emphasised professional exchanges and exposure to modern naval technology, with the ship scheduled to depart on October 10. Yet, amid Bangladesh’s fragile interim administration under Dr. Muhammad Yunus, escalating regional tensions with India and China, and a history of US-Bangladesh frictions, this docking has ignited fierce debate.
Is it a benign step toward Indo-Pacific stability, or a calculated US manoeuvre to embed itself in the Bay of Bengal, exploiting Dhaka’s vulnerabilities and challenging the regional balance of power?
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The timing of the USS Fitzgerald’s arrival could not be more charged. Bangladesh remains in political limbo following the August 2024 ouster of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, backed by the US deep state and economic strife.
Yunus’ interim government, sworn in as chief adviser, grapples with unrest, a humanitarian crisis involving Rohingya refugees, and accusations of Islamist resurgence.
Economically, the nation faces inflation, debt burdens, and stalled projects, making Western aidโparticularly from the USโa lifeline. Recent US engagements, such as the January 2025 Coast Guard assistance for port security and September’s joint exercise with 120 American officers in Chattogram, underscore a warming of ties.
Commodore Mahfuz Alam, Bangladesh Navy spokesperson, hailed the visit as a “symbol of trust,” while US Navy Commander Timothy Shanley stressed its role in Indo-Pacific stability. Yet, critics portray Yunus’ overtures as a desperate pivot, trading sovereignty for support in a post-Hasina vacuum where Dhaka’s non-aligned foreign policy frays at the edges.
Historically, US-Bangladesh naval interactions have been sparse and shadowed by 1971’s scars. During the Liberation War, the US Seventh Fleet, including the USS Enterprise, deployed to the Bay of Bengal in support of Pakistan, a move that nearly escalated into a superpower confrontation with the Soviet Union.
Post-independence, relations thawed sporadicallyโe.g., the USS Kearsarge’s 2007 Cyclone Sidr relief missionโbut no destroyer anchored until now. This gap reflects Bangladesh’s Cold War-era alignment with India and the Soviet bloc, contrasted by US sanctions over labour rights and democratic backsliding under Hasina.
The Fitzgerald’s entry, then, symbolises a rupture: a Yunus-led thaw that aligns with Washington’s “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy, countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) encroachments in the Bay of Bengal.
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Official narratives from Dhaka and Washington paint the visit as a pragmatic partnership. The Bay of Bengal is a chokepoint for 25% of global trade, faces piracy, climate-induced disasters, and trafficking. These issues, coupled with US expertise, via systems like the RQ-21 Blackjack drones reportedly discussed for handover, could bolster Bangladesh’s nascent capabilities.
Pro-government voices in Bangladesh, echoed in ISPR releases, frame it as “new momentum” for international relations, potentially unlocking US investments amid economic turmoil. From a US perspective, as articulated in broader Indo-Pacific doctrines, such engagements deter aggression, enhance interoperability, and secure sea lanes without overt basingโechoing visits to allies like Sri Lanka earlier in October 2025.
Analysts like those at the Atlantic Council note Bangladesh’s “strategic appeal” as a bridge between India and China, suggesting the visit could stabilise a volatile arc from Myanmar to the Andaman Sea.
However, scepticism abounds, particularly regarding US intentions. In Bangladesh, opposition voices decry the docking as “submission” to Western pressure, accusing Yunus of “selling out” sovereignty for aid. One analyst quipped, “No country sends a guided-missile destroyer as friendship”โa vessel armed with Tomahawk missiles, Aegis radar, and MH-60R helicopters, hardly a neutral humanitarian asset.
Public discourse on platforms like X (formerly Twitter) amplifies this, with users questioning if it’s an “achievement or failure” of regional diplomacy, some linking it to unpermitted US C-130J flights into Chattogram.
More alarmingly, conspiracy-laden narratives allege a US-orchestrated “Arab Spring” redux: stoking civil unrest via special forces like the late Green Beret Terence Arvel Jackson, training militants in Rohingya camps, and eyeing Chattogram’s madrasas to fabricate a “militant state” pretext for basing.
While unsubstantiated, Jackson’s death remains murky, tied to “unconventional warfare” per sourcesโthese echo fears of US regime-change tactics from Libya to Sudan, where interventions fragmented states under humanitarian guises.
The concern escalates this further, with claims of US troops massing in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and Sylhet for a December invasion of Myanmar, backed by Arakan Army insurgents, to expel Chinese influence and carve a “Christian state” spanning Rakhine, CHT, and India’s northeastโpotentially landlocking Bangladesh.
Regionally, the visit exacerbates tensions. For India, Bangladesh’s “big brother” and key partner against Chinese expansion, the Fitzgerald’s presence signals encirclement.
New Delhi views Chattogramโa BRI hub with Chinese-funded Payra and Mongla portsโas its eastern flank’s gateway. Yunus’s overtures to Washington, including potential RQ-21 integrations for border surveillance, could monitor India’s northeast or Rohingya flows, but also erode India’s influence post-Hasina. Indian observers, per anonymous security experts, warn of a “fundamental shift” in South Asia’s architecture, with US port access challenging the “Neighbourhood First” policy.
Border flare-upsโkillings, Hasina’s extradition demands, and Yunus’ veiled threats over India’s “Seven Sisters” states already strain ties.
X posts from Indian defense handles highlight the irony: the same USS Fitzgerald that shadowed Pakistan in 1971 now docks unopposed, questioning if it’s India’s “foreign policy failure.” Reports of US C-130J landings with over 100 troops in Chattogram, amid joint exercises like Pacific Angel 25-3, fuel alarms of a “geopolitical storm,” with India deploying IL-76s to Myanmar for counter-drills.
China, too, perceives a counter-encroachment. Beijing’s $2.1 billion pledges during Yunus’s March 2025 visit, including Teesta River projects and airfield proposals near India’s “Chicken’s Neck,” aimed to lock in influence.
Yet US naval forays, framed as piracy patrols, could disrupt BRI sea lanes and Myanmar ops, where China backs the junta against rebels. Reports of a nascent “China-Bangladesh-Pakistan axis”โvia Kunming trilateral talksโrattle Washington and Delhi, but Dhaka’s rejection of adversarial blocs suggests pragmatic hedging.
Still, the Rakhine Corridor dispute, pitting Yunus against army chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman, underscores civil-military rifts that US engagement might exploit or exacerbate.
Analystsโ assertions of China facing a “diplomatic disaster” for initially backing Yunus as an “anti-India” ally amplify Beijing’s predicament, portraying US moves as a bid to turn Myanmar into a “colony.”
Critically, US intentions appear dual-edged: genuine security cooperation amid shared threats like climate migration and Houthi-style disruptions in the Indian Ocean, but laced with strategic hedging. Washington’s Indo-Pacific pushโevident in the Burma Act for Myanmar democratisationโseeks partners to “curb China’s presence” without alienating India.
The RQ-21 Blackjack handover, confirmed in US documents and operational since September 2025 by Bangladesh’s Army and Navy, exemplifies this: a joint regiment will manufacture and operate these tactical UAS for maritime monitoring, border security, and peacekeeping, building on exercises like Tiger Lightning 2025 in Sylhet and Tiger Shark in Chattogram.
Former Ambassador Peter Haas’s 2023 pledges for SAFE boats and advanced gear underscore continuity, though Hasina’s rejections of basing demands (e.g., on St. Martin’s Island) contrast with Yunus’ acquiescence.
Yet, risks abound: overreach could validate “pawn” narratives, fueling anti-Western backlash in Bangladesh’s Islamist-leaning streets or prompting Chinese retaliation via debt traps. For Yunus, the calculus is starkโUS ties offer economic ballast but invite accusations of neocolonialism, potentially destabilising his regime before February 2026 elections, which critics deem rigged amid media crackdowns and Islamist alliances like Jamaat-e-Islami.
In sum, the USS Fitzgerald’s brief anchorage belies deeper currents. Far from mere goodwill, it heralds Bangladesh’s geopolitical reorientation, threading US ambitions through a needle’s eye of regional rivalriesโfrom drone facilities enhancing surveillance to unsubstantiated invasion plots stoking Myanmar fears. As one commentator noted, “Opening ports to foreign militaries opens sovereignty to doubt.” Dhaka must navigate this without becoming a flashpoint; failure risks turning the Bay of Bengal from a trade artery to a tinderbox.
With the ship now departed as of October 10, the real exercisesโdiplomatic and otherwiseโhave only just begun.
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